Jumat, 22 November 2013

Aside from pari passu or a priority scheme, historical insolvency laws used many methods for distributing losses. The Talmud (ca 200AD) envisaged that each remaining penny would be dealt out to each creditor in turn, until a creditor received all he was owed, or the money ran out. This meant the small creditors were more likely to be paid in full than large and powerful creditors.[37]

The priority system is reinforced by a line of case law, whose principle is to ensure that creditors cannot contract out of the statutory regime:

        The general principle, according to the Mellish LJ in Re Jeavons, ex parte Mackay[38] is that "a person cannot make it a part of his contract that, in the event of bankruptcy, he is then to get some additional advantage which prevents the property being distributed under the bankruptcy laws." So in that case, Jeavons made a contract to give Brown & Co an armour plates patent, and in return Jeavons would get royalties. Jeavons also got a loan from Brown & Co. They agreed half the royalties would pay off the loan, but if Jeavons went insolvent, Brown & Co would not have to pay any royalties. The Court of Appeal held half the royalties would still need to be paid, because this was a special right for Brown & Co that only arose upon insolvency.
        In a case where a creditor is owed money by an insolvent company, but also the creditor itself owes a sum to the company, Forster v Wilson[39] held that the creditor may set-off the debt, and only needs to pay the difference. The creditor does not have to pay all its debts to the company, and then wait with other unsecured creditors for an unlikely repayment.
        However, this depends on the sums for set-off actually being in the creditors' possession. In British Eagle International Air Lines Ltd v Compaigne Nationale Air France,[40] a group of airlines, through the International Air Transport Association had a netting system to deal with all the expenses they incurred to one another efficiently. All paid into a common fund, and then at the end of each month, the sums were settled at once. British Eagle went insolvent and was a debtor overall to the scheme, but Air France owed it money. Air France claimed it should not have to pay British Eagle, was bound to pay into the netting scheme, and have the sums cleared there. The House of Lords said this would have the effect of evading the insolvency regime. It did not matter that the dominant purpose of the IATA scheme was for good business reasons. It was nevertheless void.
        Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc observed that the general principle consists of two subrules — the anti-deprivation rule (formerly known as "fraud upon the bankruptcy law") and the pari passu rule, which are addressed to different mischiefs — and held that, in borderline cases, a commercially sensible transaction entered into in good faith should not be held to infringe the first rule.
        All these anti-avoidance rules are, however, subject to the very large exception that creditors remain able to jump up the priority queue, through the creation of a security interest.

See also: Netting and Set-off (law)
Secured lending
Main articles: UK banking law, Banking law, and Security interest
The Bank of England (est 1694) is the lender to all other banks, at an interest rate set by the Monetary Policy Committee under the Bank of England Act 1998. When lending on money to businesses at a higher interest rate, banks will contract for fixed and floating charges to decrease their risk and stabilise profits.

While UK insolvency law fixes a priority regime, and within each class of creditor distribution of assets is proportional or pari passu, creditors can "jump up" the priority ladder through contracts. A contract for a security interest, which is traditionally conceptualised as creating a proprietary right that is enforceable against third parties, will generally allow the secured creditor to take assets away, free from competing claims of other creditors if the company cannot service its debts. This is the first and foremost function of a security interest: to elevate the creditor's place in the insolvency queue. A second function of security is to allow the creditor to trace the value in an asset through different people, should the property be wrongfully disposed of. Third, security assists independent, out-of-court enforcement for debt repayment (subject to the statutory moratorium on insolvency), and so provides a lever against which the secured lender can push for control's over the company's management.[41] However, given the adverse distributional impact between creditors, the economic effect of secured lending is frequently characterised as a negative externality.[42] With an ostensibly private contract between a secured lender and a company, assets that would be available to other creditors are diminished without their consent and without them being privy to the bargain. Nevertheless, security interests are commonly argued to facilitate the raising of capital and hence economic development, which is argued to indirectly benefits all creditors.[43] UK law has, so far, struck a compromise approach of enforcing all "fixed" or "specific" security interests, but only partially enforcing floating charges that cover a range of assets that a company trades with. The holders of a floating charge take subject to preferential creditors and a "ring fenced fund" for up to a maximum of £600,000 reserved for paying unsecured creditors.[44] The law requires that details of most kinds of security interests are filed on the register of charges kept by Companies House. However this does not include transactions with the same effect of elevating creditors in the priority queue, such as a retention of title clause or a Quistclose trust.[45]
Debentures
Main article: Debenture

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